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Fraud diamond model which was raised by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) has been
one of models widely used to explain the motives and reasons of the perpetrators
in committing fraud. The model consists of pressure, opportunity, rationalization,
and the forth component added, which is capability. The capability component has
become one big question mark for most of researchers regarding to its existence
in fraud diamond model. Sridhar Ramamoorti, III, Koletar, and Rope (2013) stated
that it remains unclear whether adding more factors is really helpful in assessing
fraud risk, meanwhile Carcello and Hermanson (2008) stated a question whether the
capability has an interaction with others components in fraud diamond. This research
aimed to examine and get the empirical evidence regarding the effect of pressure,
opportunity, and rationalization toward fraudulent financial reporting with capability
as its moderating variable. Pressure was measured by ROA (Return on Assets),
opportunity by change of CEO or CFO, rationalization by turn of auditor, capability by
educational background of CEO or CFO, and fraudulent financial reporting by Beneish
Model. This study uses 255 data of manufacturing company listed on Indonesia Stock
Exchange in 2012-2016. The data analysis technique used in this study is logistic
regression analysis. The result showed that pressure and opportunity have significant
and positive effect toward fraudulent financial reporting, while rationalization does
not have significant effect. This study also showed that capability was proved in
moderating the effect of pressure and rationalization toward fraudulent financial
reporting, while it was not proved in moderating the effect of opportunity toward
fraudulent financial reporting.
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The fraudulent financial reporting continues to increase and causes large losses. With
the percentage of occurrence only 10%, this fraud caused a loss of $975,000. ACFE
(2016) stated that in the distribution of losses due to fraud, a nominal value of $
1,000,000 or more increased from 20.6% in 2012, 21.9% in 2014, and 23.2% in 2016.
Ruankaew (2013) stated that prior to reduce fraud and managing the risk of fraud,
the company must first identify the factors which are triggering the fraud. Various
theories have been stated to explain the phenomenon of fraud, such as fraud trian-
gle and fraud diamond. Skousen et al. (2008) stated that there are three conditions
faced by a fraudster. First, an individual financial need or financial pressure. Second,
fraudsters have the opportunity to commit fraud. Third, the individuals involved in
fraud will rationalize that the act of committing fraud is still in line with their ethical
code. Fraud diamond developed by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) is the development
of fraud triangle, in which there is addition of component capability to complement
the component in fraud triangle.
Some literatures reveal that the existence of capability as an element of fraud dia-
mond is questionable. Sridhar Ramamoorti, III, Koletar, and Rope (2013) stated that it
remains a big question as the addition of factors in the fraudmodel can help a person to
assess the risk of fraud. Schuchter and Levi (2013) also recommend that the element of
capability is not something new, but only a supporting element to explain the existing
Fraud Triangle model. Carcello and Hermanson (2008) also presented some research
questions related to capability, one of which is related whether the capability interacts
with other components in fraud diamond.
This study aims to examine the effect of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization
on fraudulent financial reporting with the capability as a moderating variable. Sharma
et al. (1981) suggested that amoderating variable could not be a significant predictor of
variables, but moderating variables may interact with other predictor variables. Some
studies have reported that capability as an independent variable has no effect on
fraudulent financial reporting (Aprilia, 2017, Zaki, 2017), thus it indicates that capability
could be a moderating variable.
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
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2.1. Agency theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained that the company is a contractual relationship
between shareholders and the party who operates the firm (management). The
agency relationship occurs because of an agreement between the two parties in
which the principal authorizes the agent to make the decision-making process for the
achievement of the principal’s interests and objectives. According to Eisenhardt (1989),
agency issues will arise when: 1) there is a conflict or difference of desire between
the principal and the agent; and 2) the existence of a difficulty or a high cost for the
principal to verify what the agent actually does.
2.2. Fraud
ACFE defines fraud as an act of fraud or mistake made by a person who knows that
such mistakes may harm others. Fraud can be classified into two types, namely fraud-
ulent financial reporting and asset misappropriation. Fraudulent financial reporting is
a misstatement or abolition of the amount or disclosure deliberately done to deceive
its users. Fraudulent financial reporting usually involves management because man-
agement is a party that can override the internal control and have control to direct
employees in the act of fraud (Suyanto, 2009). Asset misappropriation is a fraud that
involves the theft of an entity’s property. It usually happens at the lower organizational
hierarchy level, although it is possible for top management to get involved.
2.3. Fraud model
A fraud triangle model proposed by Donald R. Cressey (1953) was used to explain the
factors that cause a person to commit acts fraud. There are three components in the
fraud triangle, namely incentives/pressure, opportunities, and rationalization. Wolfe
and Hermanson (2004) developed the model into fraud diamond, where Wolfe and
Hermanson added an additional qualitative component, which is capability.
2.4. Research model
Based on the theory and previous studies related to this research, here is proposed a
conceptual framework to describe the relationship of independent variables with the
dependent variable in this study. Independent variables used are pressure, opportunity,
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and rationalization, while the dependent variable used is fraudulent financial reporting.
The relationship between variables will be moderated by the capability. Here is the
conceptual framework compiled in this study:
Figure 1: Research Model.
2.5. Hypotheses Development
2.5.1. Pressure toward fraudulent financial reporting
The pressures experienced by individuals or corporations will encourage them to take
any action to minimize the intensity of the pressure. ROA is a measurement that can
be used to measure operational performance and see how efficiently a company can
use its assets to generate profits (Skousen et al., 2008). This ROA can be used to assess
management performance and the basis for determining the amount of bonuses and
salary increases that management will accept. Not achieving the target of ROA that
has been set will encourage management to commit fraud by changing the numbers
in the financial statements so that financial ratios can be turned into an ideal ratio as
expected by the creditors.
H1: Pressure positively affects the fraudulent financial reporting.
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2.5.2. Opportunity toward fraudulent financial reporting
The unstable condition of the company can be determined from the high turnover of
senior management and members of the board of directors. The higher the rotation of
the directors, the weaker the existing supervision is related to the operational decision
making of the company. Shidar Ramamoorti (2008) explains that fraud is usually a form
of ”teamwork” and often involves collusion between several parties. Boyle, Carpenter,
and Hermanson (2012) explain that fraud cases in financial statements often involve
executives, where 89% of cases involve the CEO or CFO of the company. Opportunity
can be determined from the presence or absence of a change of CEO or CFO in a
company. The higher the turnover of CEO or CFO, the weaker the existing supervision
related to corporate decision making.
H2: Opportunity positively affects the fraudulent financial reporting.
2.5.3. Rationalization toward fraudulent financial reporting
Skousen et al. (2008) stated that cases of audit failure increased after the change of
auditors. Some companies change the auditor because with the change of auditors,
the fraud committed by the management will not be detected by the new auditor.
Companies who change the auditor will reduce the possibility of detection of fraud in
the financial statements made by the company.
H3: Rationalization positively affects the fraudulent financial reporting.
2.5.4. Pressure toward fraudulent financial reporting with
capability as moderating variable
People with pressures will tend to make an effort to overcome the pressure in various
ways. The expectation of investors will cause pressure for the management when the
performance of the company is considered still far from the target set. Not achieving
the targets set will encourage management to commit fraud by changing the numbers
in the financial statements so that the financial ratios can also turn into an ideal ratio
as expected by the creditors.
Capability is a condition in which the fraudster is aware of the opportunity and has
the ability to transform it into reality (Abdullahi & Mansor, 2015). With the capability,
management has an understanding of which areas can be manipulated and which
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parts of internal controls are relatively weak. Capabilities will facilitate management in
manipulating financial statements because management has access to change finan-
cial statements in accordance with what they want. Not only that, management can
change the numbers in the financial statements to display the prime financial ratios so
as to indicate that the company has reached the expected target.
H4: Capabilities increase the effect of pressure toward fraudulent financial reporting.
2.5.5. Opportunity toward fraudulent financial reporting with
capability as moderating variable
The unstable condition of the company can be determined from the high turnover
of senior management and members of the board of directors. The high turnover of
the directors will represent how big the CEO power is, which will describe how much
opportunity management has for committing fraud because the new directors will not
know the things that have been done by the rest of management. The opportunity to
commit fraud will be strengthened when a person has capabilities. With great capabil-
ity, individuals or management can dominate operational decisions so that decisions
will benefit the individual or the interests of certain group. Capability also facilitates
the individual to understand the weakness of company’s internal control so they can
prepare their fraud action.
H5: Capabilities increase the effect of opportunity toward fraudulent financial report-
ing.
2.5.6. Rationalization toward fraudulent financial reporting with
capability as moderating variable
Individuals who already have a justification on their mind, will be more triggered to
commit fraud with the capabilities they have. When the individual feels that he is enti-
tled to something more than what he has received, the individual with the capability
will be more convinced that committing fraud is worth doing. With the capability, the
individual is convinced by the justification that he deserves for things he will get by
doing fraud. Capability will support the fraudsters’ mind that fraud is indeed worth
doing because in fact, they have the capability and ability to commit acts of fraud.
H6: Capabilities increase the effect of rationalization toward fraudulent financial
reporting.
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3. Research Methodology
3.1. Population and samples
The population used in this study is manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange in 2012-2016. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling,
where the sample determination is done on the basis of conformity of certain charac-
teristics and criteria. The criteria determined for this study:
1. Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2012-2016;
2. Have a positive pre-tax profit value on 1 (one) year prior to the fraud;
3. Have complete data related to the variables used in the research.
3.2. Operational definition and variables measurement
3.2.1. Pressure
Pressure was defined as a condition when a person commit fraud because he/she has
an urgent need, which could not be told to others. This study uses Return on Total
Assets (ROA), in which ROA is a measurement of operational performance that used
to indicate the efficiency of management in using all available assets. ROA is often
used to assess management performance and determine the amount of bonuses and
salary increases that management will accept. ROA will be calculated by comparing
earnings before tax in the year prior to the fraud with total assets. Management uses
pre-tax profit in the previous year as a benchmark and also as a target that the ROA
shall not be declined in a current year. Pressure will arise when there is an indication
of declining ROA because management is expected to be able to maintain or improve
its performance. ROA used in this study is a positive ROA, because the positive value
of ROA is an indication of pressure for the management since they have to maintain it
positive.
ROA = Pre-tax profit𝑡−1 / Total assets𝑡
3.2.2. Opportunity
Opportunity was defined as condition that provides an opportunity for management
or employees to mislead financial statements (Elder et al., 2011). Opportunity can be
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seen from the presence or absence of a change of CEO or CFO in a company. In the
accounting decision-making process, CFO will be strongly influenced by the CEO as
the leader who is responsible for all aspects of the company. With the change of CEO,
the CFO will have more opportunity in making accounting decisions because there
is a transition from the previous CEO to the new CEO which is causing less effective
supervision over the actions of the CFO. On contrary, with CFO changes, the CEO has
a greater opportunity to engage in fraudulent financial reporting because there is a
change from CFO who understands the financial history of the company into a new
CFO who has lack of financial information of the company.
TOTALTURN = Dummy variabel for change of directors, 1 = presence of change
of CEO or CFO in 2 (two) years prior to fraud, and 0 = absence of change of
CEO or CFO in 2 (two) years prior to fraud.
3.2.3. Rationalization
Rationalization is the presence of an attitude, character, or set of ethical values that
enable management or employees to engage in dishonest acts, or a condition when
they justify themselves to commit such dishonest acts (Elder et al., 2011). This study
uses auditor turnover to measure the rationalization performed by management. This
is based on the findings of some researchers that audit failure and litigation cases
increased after the change of auditors.
AUDCHANGE = Dummy variabel for change of auditor, 1 = presence of change
of auditor in 2 (two) years prior to fraud, and 0 = absence of change of auditor
in 2 (two) years prior to fraud.
3.2.4. Fraudulent financial reporting
Fraudulent financial reporting is amisstatement or deletion of the amount or disclosure
that is deliberately done to deceive its users. This study will use dummy variables
through the Beneish Model, which 1 will be used to represents the firms with M-score
above -2.22 and 0 for firms with M-scores lower than -2.22. The M-score above -2.22
would indicate fraudulent financial reporting (Abbas, 2017). Beneish Model has two
versions, in which the first version uses eight ratios, while the second version uses
only five ratios. Some studies show that only five ratios give significant results on the
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model, so this study uses five ratios in Beneish model. Here is the M-score equation
of Beneish Model used in this research:
𝑀 = −6, 065 + 0, 823𝐷𝑆𝑅𝐼 + 0, 906𝐺𝑀𝐼 + 0, 593𝐴𝑄𝐼 + 0, 717𝑆𝐺𝐼 + 0, 107𝐷𝐸𝑃
3.2.5. Capability
Capability is an employee’s ability to penetrate existing internal controls, develop
sophisticated embezzlement strategies, and to control situation by influencing others
to cooperate with him (Aprilia, 2017). This study uses the educational background
proxy as stated by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004), that a fraudster is an intelligent
person to understand and exploit the weaknesses of the company’s internal controls
and take advantage of its position and authorization.
CAPABILITY = Dummy variabel for capability, 1 = presence of CEO or CFO with
finance educational background, and 0 = absence of CEO or CFO with finance
educational background.
4. The Empirical Result
The coefficient of determination measures the ability of independent variables in
explaining the dependent variable. The coefficient of determination (Nagelkerke R
Square) shows the result of 0.308 or 30.8%. This indicates that the contribution of
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization to the fraudulent financial reporting are
30.8%, while the 69.2% was the contribution of other variables that are not used in
this study.
Goodness of fit model is used to knowing the compatibility of the model with the
observation data, that explains whether the regression model is able or feasible to
be used to predict the relationship between independent variables and dependent
variable. The test result shows statistical Chi-square test of 10.214 with a probability
of 0.250. This shows that the statistical value (0.250) is greater than the level of signif-
icance (𝛼= 0.05), so it can be stated that the model is compatible with the observation
data, which is capable or feasible to predict the relationship between independent
variables and dependent variable.
The result shows that the pressure has Wald statistical test value of 23.756 with
probability of 0.000. The result shows a smaller probability (0,000) than level of sig-
nificance (= 0.05), so it can be concluded that there is a significant effect on pressure
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T 1: Test result of partial significance.
Variable B Wald Sig. Odd Ratio
Pressure 11,710 23,756 0,000 121.835,454
Opportunity 3,836 8,426 0,004 46,356
Rationalization -0,584 0,833 0,361 0,558
Constant -6,654 17,472 0,000 0,001
toward fraudulent financial reporting. The higher the positive value ROA owned by the
company, the higher the tendency of management to commit fraud in the financial
statements. From the investor side, investors expect a stable and increasing perfor-
mance from year to year. While investors are given a positive ROA ratio, investors will
expect management to maintain good performance in the years to come. In terms
of management itself, the value of a positive ROA ratio will have an impact on the
determination of salaries and bonuses that will be received. These two points of view
will put pressure on management, where management will strive to maintain investor
expectations and meet its own incentives for bonuses and salary increases.
The partial significance test of the opportunity toward fraudulent financial reporting
shows a Wald test value of 8.426 with probability of 0.000. The result shows a smaller
probability (0,000) than level of significance (= 0.05), so it can be concluded that there
is a significant effect over the opportunity toward fraudulent financial reporting. With
a change of CEO or CFO in a company, the opportunity will be opened to those who
would like to commit fraud in the financial statements. With the change of CFO, the
CEO has a greater opportunity to engage in fraud because there is no longer a CFO
who understand the financial history of the company. Likewise, if there is a change of
CEO, CFO will have more opportunity in making accounting decision because there is
a transition period from previous CEO to new CEO which is causing less supervision of
action made by CFO.
The result shows that the rationalization variable has a Wald statistical test value
of 0.833 with a probability of 0.361. The result shows the probability value of 0,361
which is bigger than level of significance (= 0,05), so it can be concluded that there
is no significant effect on rationalization toward fraudulent financial reporting. The
insignificant result between rationalization and fraudulent financial reporting can be
caused by a lack of precise proxy rationalization used. Skousen et al. (2008) stated
that they have not found yet a proper proxy which can describe the character of ratio-
nalization. Rationalization is closely related to the internal characteristics possessed by
an individual, so it is quite difficult tomeasure the rationalization through a quantitative
data.
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This study uses the capability variable as a moderating variable to examine the
role of capability in the effect of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization toward
fraudulent financial reporting. Here are the results of moderation testing:
T 2: Result of Moderation Testing.
Variable Wald Test Probability Result
M0 M1 M0 M1
Pressure 1,064 19,358 0,302 0,000 Moderating
Opportunity 0,397 0,000 0,529 0,998 Not Moderating
Rationalization 0,000 6,387 0,999 0,011 Moderating
The result of Wald test of capability with M = 0 (CEO or CFO with non-finance educa-
tional background) is 1.064 with probability of 0.302, while for the capability with M =
1 (CEO or CFO with finance educational background) is 19,358 with probability of 0.000.
It can be concluded that the variable capability is a moderating the effect of pressure
toward fraudulent financial reporting, especially on the CEO or CFO with the finance
educational background. With the capability, management has an understanding of
which areas can be manipulated and which parts of internal controls are relatively
weak. The educational background in finance will help the CEO or CFO to identify which
part that can be manipulated because the CEO or CFO has been passed an education
in finance.
The result of Wald test of capability with M = 0 (CEO or CFO with non-finance
educational background) is 0,397 with probability 0,529, while for capability with M
= 1 (CEO or CFO with finance educational background) is 0.000 with probability of
0.998. It can be concluded that the capability is not a moderating the effect of oppor-
tunity toward fraudulent financial reporting, either CEO or CFO with an educational
background in finance or those with non-finance educational background. This can
be caused by the tenure of a person who holds the position and also his/her working
experience in similar field. Although a person does not have an educational background
in finance, it is still possible that a person can have ability in finance field. The ability
and understanding of finance can be supported by the number of working experience
in a similar field which can make someone expert in finance.
The result of theWald test of capabilitywithM = 0 (CEO or CFOwithwith non-finance
educational background) is 0.000 with probability of 0.999, while for the capability
with M = 1 (CEO or CFO with finance educational background) is 6,387 with probability
of 0.011. However, this study shows that rationalization as an independent variable has
no effect toward fraudulent financial reporting, so capability could not be amoderating
variable between rationalization and fraudulent financial reporting.
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5. Conclusion
Based on the results of research, these are following conclusions from this study:
1) The test results indicate that the pressure has significantly positive effect toward
fraudulent financial reporting. The positive and significant relationship between pres-
sure and fraudulent financial reporting shows that the higher the positive value ROA
the company has, the higher the tendency of management to commit fraud in the
financial statements. Fraudulent financial reporting will be committed when manage-
ment is under pressure to maintain investor expectations and meet its own incentives
for bonuses and salary increases; 2) Test results indicate that the opportunity has
significantly positive effect toward fraudulent financial reporting. This indicates that
a company with a change of CEO or CFO in 2 years prior to fraud will be more likely to
increase the probability of fraudulent financial reporting. CEO and CFO are critical to the
company’s accounting decisions, so a change of CEO or CFO will open up opportunities
for fraud in the financial statements; 3) Test results show that rationalization does
not significantly affect the fraudulent financial reporting. This may be due to the lack
of a rationalization proxy used, for example: the change of auditors. Rationalization
is closely related to the internal characteristics possessed by an individual, so it is
difficult to measure the rationalization through the change of auditors; 4) The test
results show that capability is moderating the effect of pressure toward fraudulent
financial reporting, especially on the CEO or CFO with the educational background in
finance. Under stressful condition by investors’ expectations and personal incentives,
managementwith a finance educational backgroundwill bemotivated to commit fraud
because they have sufficient capability to ensure that their fraud is undetectable; 5)
The test results show that capability is not moderating the effect of opportunity toward
fraudulent financial reporting, either on CEO or CFO with an educational background
in finance or non-finance. This can be caused by the length of tenure of person who
holds the position and his/her working experience in similar field. Someone without
finance educational background could be an expert by doing things in a long period
which is measured by their working experience; 6) The test results indicate that capa-
bility is moderating the effect of rationalization toward fraudulent financial reporting.
However, this study shows that rationalization has no significant effect toward fraud-
ulent financial reporting, so capability could not be a moderating variable between
rationalization and fraudulent financial reporting.
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